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The Anger and Heartbreak of 
Young Malay Men
Sometime in June 2021, I wrote an 
article for Stratsea, a Singaporean web-
based magazine dedicated to regional 
security and politics. The article, which 
is	the	first	part	of	this	essay,	was	based	
on my personal observations since 
2018, and I will write excerpts from the 
published article here, Returning To Our 
Roots: The Anger and Heartbreak of 
The roots of 21st century Malay anger: When young 





This article seeks to explain briefly to the reader about far right nationalist movements in 
Malaysia. While this is not a recent occurrence, it spiked during the time of Pakatan Harapan, 
the Opposition bloc that won the 13th Malaysia General Elections. Seeing non Malay/Muslim 
faces in the new government frightened many, even those who were against the former Barisan 
Nasional government. The paper is based on my current research on Malay youth identity of 
both genders, who are pushing the Malay narrative to the fore, as they demand their rights as 
Malays; Covid 19 has shown that economic opportunities are getting more scarce. The people 
I am studying and have spoken to feel that they have low social capital, and their uneasiness 
at seeing minority communities ‘thrive’ in Malaysia. What is causing this fear? This article 
posits economic reasons.
Keywords: Malay, far right movement, nationalism
Young Malay Men.[1]
In the article,  I wrote about the 
Tanjak Boys (young men wearing the 
traditional Malay headgear), when 
the Malay mass took to the streets to 
protest	the	new	Malaysian	government’s	
ratification	of	the	UN	convention	
known as International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD). UMNO, 
PAS and other NGOs felt ICERD  was 
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contrary to the constitution, especially 
Malay and Bumiputra special rights. 
This happened in 2018, fresh after 
Pakatan	Harapan’s	win	and	Barisan	
Nasional’s	loss	at	the	14th General 
Elections. After the post election 
euphoria, many Malays felt disconcerted 
by the sight of so many non-Muslims 
in the Cabinet. Malaysiakini.com (as 
well as other Malaysian media) reported 
that “... nearly 60 percent of the Malays 
surveyed were not happy with the 
performance of the Pakatan Harapan 
government.”[2] The study, conducted 
jointly by pollster Ilham Centre and 
think tank Penang Institute, interviewed 
2,614 Malay respondents between Oct 
24 and Dec 24, 2018, showed that more 
than 60 percent of the respondents 
believed that non-Muslims were now in 
control of the government and that DAP 
was calling the shots in Putrajaya. This 
was not a reactionary sentiment among 
the Malays; in fact many Malays from 
all backgrounds were fearful that their 
rights as Malays and Muslims would be 
vanquished	under	Pakatan	Harapan’s	
rule.
Now who are these young men 
that you can see on their Instagram 
accounts, such as Bangsa Bertauhid, 
Tanjakbersayyid, MisiRakyat, to name 
a	few?
In my Stratsea article I wrote, “...  
they were Malay nationalists, but not 
really supremacists. As entrepreneurs, 
they were self-sustaining in the name of 
race and religion, and independent from 
the state, gave back to charity. Wresting 
back this identity that had long been 
politicised and hijacked by the powers 
that	be	and	political	actors,	it	solidified	
and increased their social capital and 
confidence,	and	provided	a	personal	and	
professional ‘Hala tuju’	(direction).”
“This (trend) was a pushback 
against what the state has deemed 
Malay identity and the Arabisation of 
Nusantara Islam, especially Wahabism 
and	Salafism.	Tanah Melayu seems to 
be in a constant state of colonisation; we 
had white masters before and now we 
have	been	living	through	Salafisation/
Wahabi-sation of our language, culture 
and faith. It would be unfair to accuse 
our Arab forefathers of destroying 
ourselves as Islam Nusantara was 
also	influenced	by	the	arrival	of	
the Hadramawt traders. The Malay 
Narrative must be brought back to the 
fore.”
Now why have these young men 
and	women	embraced	this	identity?	
This is an on-going topic in our work: 
every interview IMAN Research*  
* In 2016 leading up to 2018, IMAN Research (IMAN) 
began a nation wide study on how (Malay Muslim) 
youths viewed their identity as Muslims and young 
Malays and their sympathy towards ISIS (Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria.) The Assalamualaikum Dunia! project 
revealed issues of identity, lack of social capital and 
angst, and these findings spilled over into IMAN’s next 
study in 2019, Believing in Extremism: What Drives 
Our Youths. 
We asked Malay Muslims between the ages of 18 
to 35 who came from four different locations in 
Peninsular Malaysia. They also had varying degrees of 
education and socio-economic status. We chose this 
demographic because they represented 66% of the 
total population in Malaysia then, and were politically 
astute (there was 83% youth turnout for the 13th 
General Elections). They were also technologically 
savvy: 47% of them had more than one mobile phone, 
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has conducted with young Malay-
Malaysians, we are told that the lack 
of social capital has made the young 
revert	to	an	identity	they	feel	‘protects’	
them. In fact, our year long project 
in 2016, Assalamualaikum Dunia! 
saw us meeting Malay youths of both 
genders aged 18 to 35 years all over 
the country, asking them how they felt 
being Malay and Muslim. In the era 
of	ISIS’s	influence	in	Malaysia,	many	
young Malay-Malaysians turned to 
Islam, as being “Malay was seen to be 
corrupt,	lazy,”	but	in	the	past	five	years,	
not only were Malay youths resentful 
of the non Muslim communities 
economic successes, they were also not 
comfortable with successful Malays. 
“They probably had connections with 
powerful people/they come from 
money, hence it is easy for them to 
gain employment,” were some of the 
comments. 
They also felt immense pressure 
to assimilate religiously and ethnically, 
through language and religion and 
were brought up under strict religious 
and heavy users of Facebook (13 million used the 
platform).
While Malaysian youths represented 62.8% of the 
total workforce, there was negative growth in mid-
income jobs. Many were unemployed. Their income 
was 40-50% less of the national average. 28% did not 
complete secondary schooling and juvenile crime was 
high. At school, they did not mix with other races.
At the time of our focus group discussions, 200 
Malay Muslims had joined ISIS. This was a higher 
ratio than Indonesia. More than 120 individuals 
had been arrested since 2013 from either trying to 
join IS or returned from fighting. There were also 
many educated Malay-Muslim women who had 
sympathy towards Syria and jihadists. Many could not 
differentiate between Syria and ISIS.
doctrines which may be xenophobic in 
nature, hence the reassertion of Islam 
as the only identity they have. Many 
commented on negative perceptions of 
Malays, “(We) Malays are seen as lazy, 
corrupt and weak. We do not want to 
identify with that, that is why we see 
ourselves	as	Muslims	first.”
There certainly was anger towards 
the state and what they felt was an 
aggrievance towards society. The Low 
Yat Plaza Riot,[3] in 2015 was one 
example of how they felt that they 
were at siege; the rise in the belief of 
conspiracy theories was evidence that 
they could no longer believe in the state 
and society. Right wing rhetoric was 
increasing as they felt embattled by 
society. 
They also expressed the 
following: Having very low feelings 
of empowerment. They had a strong 
yearning for space to explore intra-
Muslims issues, interact with “others”, 
and “struggled”  with issues. Again, 
they were cynical towards politics and 
the political process and acknowledged 
the politicization of religion in 
Malaysia. Religion was integral yet 
it’s	a	complex	relationship,	especially	
when in doubt. They were curious 
about the non-Malays, as cross-culture 
interactions regardless of class and 
geography was very low.
Despite the anger they expressed, 
Malay-Muslim youths that we 
interveiwed could discuss contentious 
issues articulately and civilly, while 
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they grasped the complexities of the 
world  and reconcile it with their Malay-
Muslim identities. While most had an 
ideal view of an Islamic state, this was 
not demonstrated into a revolutionary 
zeal à la ISIS propaganda. Most do not 
agree with the violence. At the same 
time, their relationship with social 
media was a Catch-22 situation: they 
had strong negative views about it, 
“sensationalising	issues,’’	yet	still		relied	
on it as a source of information. 
They also expressed the 
following: having very low feelings 
of empowerment. They had a strong 
yearning for space to explore intra-
Muslims issues, interact with “others”, 
and “struggled”  with issues. Again, 
they were cynical towards politics and 
the political process and acknowledged 
the politicization of religion in 
Malaysia. Religion was integral yet 
it’s	a	complex	relationship,	especially	
when in doubt. They were curious 
about the non-Malays, as cross-culture 
interactions regardless of class and 
geography was very low.
I have been asked as to whether this 
phenomenon was masculine. No, there 
are women who are now at the forefront 
of far right nationalism, and when one 
compares them to the Tanjak Boys, one 
would say that they are more angry.
Women at the Forefront of 
Nationalist Anger
In a previous brief I wrote for 
IMAN Research, Enabling Extremism 
In Malaysia: The Rise of Capitalist, 
Far-right Muslims and the Prelude to 
Lipstick Jihad, I wrote and discussed 
about how Malay-Muslim women 
were increasingly being socialised into 
a hardline brand of Islam. They were 
mainly middle to upper middle income 
professionals, who viewed themselves 
as	Muslims	first,	more	so	than	Malay-
Malaysian. While it in undeniable that 
we have had Malay-Muslim women 
joining militant activities and groups, 
most of the women we observed are 
God observant, and cannot be perceived 
as extremists or radicals.
I am now beginning my study of a 
group of women who are defenders of 
Malay and Muslim rights in Malaysia. 
One example would be a female 
professor who is  a visible personality; 
highly	educated,		fluent	in	both	English	
and Bahasa Malaysia, and eloquent. 
She is a member of a few far right 
organisations. She is being used here 
as an example of how powerful she 
and women aligned with her ideology 
are. It was reported on social media 
that she discovered that a popular 
Japanese bookstore chain was selling 
books promoting the LGBTQ lifestyle 
to young people, and persuaded the 
bookstore to stop selling the books. That 
a woman, and Malay-Muslim, was able 
to impact the sales of an international 
bookstore chain, is formidable.
She	also	campaigned	for	Malaysia’s	
human	rights	body’s	study	on	the	third	
gender to be scrapped. In less than 12 
68
The roots of 21st century Malay anger: When young men and women come to the fore
hours, the campaign garnered over 
30,000 signatures. This woman is 
powerful. She is educated. She is part of 
the New Muslimah of the 21st Century 
demographic, and if not already part of 
the T20 demographic, aspires to be part 
of the group.
The professor, together with her 
colleagues, pushed and organised a 
webinar on Islamophobia  in July 2021. 
While the speakers were predominantly 
men, she was one of the organisers, 
steering the agenda across. The launch 
of the report was not just welcomed 
by those aligned with their values, but 
a number of human rights observers**  
and liberals who attended the event on 
Zoom,	agreed	to	some	of	the	findings	
that they proposed, such as how the 
English speaking media would not 
publish their right-wing sentiments, 
which ran against the spirit of freedom 
of the media, and democracy.
So are Malay Muslim women the 
weaker sex, as many in the Western 
world	claim	Muslim	women	are?
Some notes to consider
In terms of gender equality, 
Malaysia is doing relatively well, with 
women accounting for the majority 
of students in public universities, and 
with nearly 32.3 percent of decision-
making positions in public service held 
by women. They make up the majority 
of the Malay middle class. The Edge 
** Some of IMAN’s staff and colleagues attended 
the virtual event, and conceded Islamophobia was a 
concern
Markets reported in August 2020, that 
“... bumiputera households made up 
53.5%	of	the	1.72	million	households	in	
Malaysia that had more than RM10,000 
in monthly gross income in 2019.” 
WundermanThompson Intelligence 
in their 2017 report,  described “... 
The Muslimah (Muslim women) 
demographic has money, is social media 
savvy, wants to look good, but religion 
is very important to them. “Nearly all 
say	they	pray	five	times	a	day;	94%	




resurgence of public piety has made 
more and more Muslims, both men 
and women, very aware of the need to 
balance being religious and looking 
modern. They are also very well versed 
with the Internet.
According to The Role of Malay 
Women in the Malaysian Workforce 
and its Impact on the Consciousness 
of Ethics and Integrity, by Khalidah 
Khalid Ali, Department of Management 
and Humanities, Universiti Teknologi 
PETRONAS, Malay women represent 
the	majority	of	the	nation’s	population	
and play diverse roles in the Malaysian 
community as students, parents, 
educators and professionals in both 
the private and public sectors. Malay 
Muslim women and their sisters are 
not just full participants in the labour 
force, but also in politics and activism. 
To note, in the civil service, women in 
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decision making is above 30 percent. 
They now contribute economically 
to household income, and also have 
a say in the religious instruction and 
education of their spouses, families and 
friends.
As you can see, (Malay-Muslim) 
women	are	impactful	to	Malaysia’s	
productivity and well-being. As I said 
in my aforementioned brief, “Malay 
Muslim women and their sisters are not 
just full participants in the labour force, 
but their presence is noted: there are 
many notable Muslim politicians like 
Nurul Izzah Anwar, and her mother, 
the former Deputy Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, Dr Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, 
for example, and many sit on boards of 
corporates and lead government-linked 
companies. To note, in the civil service, 
women in decision making is above 
30 percent. Malay women are very 
active in community work too. And 
that they now contribute economically 
to household income, they also have 
a say in the religious instruction and 
education of their spouses, families and 
friends.”[4]
There is growing piety among 
(middle-class) female Muslims but 
there are different actors, factors and 
different manifestations/ results, which 
we must acknowledge. In general, they 
are becoming more conservative, and 
some turn extreme and radical (but this 
also not only due to religious factors, 
but also social, political and economic 
etc), and not every woman becomes an 
extremist.
Nationalism and Populism are 
Global
What we are seeing in Malaysia 
right now, is also being experienced 
throughout the world. Populism, simply 
put, is a political approach that strives 
to appeal to ordinary people who feel 
that their concerns are disregarded 
by established elite groups. Right-
wing populism, also called national 
populism and right-wing nationalism, 
as	defined	by	Far-Right	Politics	in	
Europe and  National Populism: The 
Revolt Against Liberal Democracy  is 
a political ideology which combines 
right-wing politics and populist 
rhetoric and themes. The rhetoric 
often consists of anti-elitist and anti-
intellectual sentiments, opposition 
to the Establishment, and speaking 
to the “common people”.[5],[6]  The 
terms populism and nationalism are 
interchangeable.
Foreign Policy reported in January 
this year that,
“From Brazil to the United States, 
Hungary to New Zealand, right-
wing extremist ideas and groups are 
posing a grave threat to democratic 
societies. Within this context, the 
ongoing support U.S. President 
Donald Trump receives from parts 
of his base despite the drop in his 
approval numbers and the riot at 
the	U.S.	Capitol	on	Jan.	6	reflects	
the continued evolution of a global 
threat. As New Zealand Prime 
Minister Jacinda Arden emphasized 
after a right-wing terrorist killed over 
50 people at a pair of mosques in her 
country, “there is no question that 
ideas and language of division and 
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hate have existed for decades, but 
their form of distribution, the tools 
of	organization—they	are	new.”	If	
there is any hope of repairing those 
divides and advancing equality, rule 
of law, an inclusive civil society, 
and respect for human rights, the 
United States needs to work with 
other countries and multilateral 
organizations to build a coalition 
to combat the growth and spread of 
right-wing extremism.”
Trump’s	America	was	an	obvious	
example, but this was also repeated in 
Europe, and seemingly liberal countries 
in Scandinavian, France, Italy. Even 
The Balkans is experiencing unrest, 
despite having gone through harrowing 
years	of	conflict,	as	repoted	by	the	
Balkan Insight, “Bosnian Far-Right 
Movement Weds Bosniak Nationalism, 
Neo-Nazism”, published in June 
this year.  IPSOS, the global market 
research an public opinion specialist, 
had just released its latest report in 
July, “Broken-System Sentiment In 
2021: Populism, Anti-Elitism And 
Nativism,”[7]	and	its	findings	cement	
the sentiments of citizens from 25 
countries of which Malaysia is included:
On	average,	56%	agree	their	
country’s	society	is	broken	and	57%	
agree that their country is in decline. To 
fully grasp the prevalence of social and 
political disaffection, IPSOS designed 
the “System Is Broken” Index, based 
on	the	level	of	agreement	with	five	
statements:
“The economy is rigged to favor the •	
rich	and	powerful”	(averaging	71%	
agree in the 25 countries surveyed)





The country “needs a strong leader •	
to take the country back from the 
rich	and	powerful”	(64%),	and
“To	fix”	the	country,	“we	need	a	•	
strong leader willing to break rules” 
(44%).
 
In fact, Malaysia is second highest 
in the Nativism Index, sharing these 
sentiments with other countries like 
Turkey:
57%	say	employers	should	favor	•	
natives over immigrants when jobs 
are scarce,
38%	agree	their	country	would	be	•	





What’s causing these movements 
in Malaysia?
Since independence, Malaysia has 
experienced a few incidences of racial/
ethnic tensions that led to violence. 
One of the biggest incidents was the 
racial riots on 13th May 1969, also 
known as the 13 May incident – a 
sectarian violence between Malays and 
Chinese community in Kuala Lumpur. 
More recent incidents were the 2001 
Kampung Medan riots, a sectarian 
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Malaysian Muslims have a favourable 
opinion	of	ISIS,	while	25%	claimed	




If we are to consider the outcomes 
of these surveys, the experience of 
increased religiosity among Muslims 
in Malaysia is not without its nuances. 
While overwhelming support is 
voiced for ideas that conform to 
orthodox Muslim belief (e.g. Quranic 
criminal penalties), there is a lot of 
disagreement when it comes to its actual 




The reader must also take note of a 
wave of Islamic revivalism that began in 
the late 1970s and 1980s. Many Malay 
students on government scholarships 
studied abroad in the United Kingdom, 
America and Australia and of course 
the Middle East. Most of them came 
from middle class backgrounds as 
well as rural, and were exposed to 
global politics and different cultures 
and lifestyles when they studied there. 
The wave of Islamic revivalism and 
the	Iranian	revolution	had	indefinitely	
impacted these students. The rise of 
reactionary post colonial discourse 
and the emergence of Ikhwan (Muslim 
Brotherhood) against the backdrop of 
a volatile Middle East shaped the rise 
of	Islamism	in	Malaysia	and	influenced	
violence between Malays and Indians 
community that started in Kampung 
Medan in Petaling Jaya; the Plaza 
Low Yat riot in 2015, where Malay 
Muslim youths demonstrated violently 
by destroying property and beating up 
members from Chinese community; 
and	most	recently	in	2018,	the	Seafield	
temple incident, where a case of land 
acquisition for redevelopment turned 
into racial Violence.  
In addition to the existing racial 
tensions among Malays and other 
ethnic minorities, there is also the 
perception of rising conservatism 
and ethno-religious sentiment among 
Malay Muslims in the country. A 








with another Merdeka Centre survey 
on attitudes towards Hudud among 
Malaysian	Muslims,	where	71%	of	
Malays polled said that they supported 
Hudud	laws.	However	only	30%	of	
those surveyed said that Malaysia 
was ready for its implementation. 
Meanwhile in response to another 
question	in	Pew’s	2013	survey,	39%	
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Malaysia will be an upper income 
country,	yet.	The	Edge	Markte’s	Special	
Report: Why high T20 numbers may 
have scant meaning, pointed out that 
wealth seem to be concentrated in urban 
areas, 
“It is interesting to note that 539,900 
—	or	37.1%	of	1.46	million	—	
households in Malaysia, which are 
deemed	to	be	in	the	country’s	top	
20%	(T20),	live	in	Selangor.	That	
is according to our back-of-the-
envelope calculations based on data 





households are actually in the Klang 
Valley, if we add the 539,900 T20 
households in Selangor, 228,500 
in Kuala Lumpur and 14,600 in 
Putrajaya.”
“Conversely,	only	13.5%	or	392,900	
of the 2.91 million households that 
are deemed to be in the B40 group 
reside in the Klang Valley. About a 
third or 963,400 of the 2.91 million 
M40 households in Malaysia live 
in the Klang Valley. (The M40 are 
Malaysians who are deemed too 
rich” to receive government aid but 
not feeling particularly rich in the 
face of the high cost of living.)
“... (the) T20, however, does 
not necessarily mean that these 
households are rich or that the 
government automatically thinks 
they are rich. The threshold just 
happens to be the cut-off point for 
the	top	20%	households	in	Malaysia	
when looking at the income levels 
of the 7.28 million Malaysian 
households in 2019.”
Hot on the heels of the above, 
comes a rather damning report by 
UNICEF, Families on the Edge. “...
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
the trajectory of socio-political Islam in 
Malaysia.
Many far right nationalists point to 
many factors, such as the proliferation 
of the LGBTQ community, marginalised 
groups such as refugees and foreign 
workers taking away jobs, and minority 
Muslim groups such as the Shiite and 
Ahmadiyyah in Malaysia, but the 
main argument they use is that despite 
Malaysia being independent for over 60 
years, the Malays are still economically 
disadvantaged.
Sometime last year in August, The 
Edge Markets reported that bumiputera 
households	made	up	53.5%	of	the	1.72	
million households in Malaysia that had 
more than RM10,000 in monthly gross 
income in 2019.
“Yet,	being	the	majority	at	69.3%	
of 29.38 million Malaysian citizens and 
65.1%	of	7.28	million	households,	the	
ethnic group ranks high in both things 
to be proud of, such as the most number 
of graduates and people earning high 
incomes, and areas that need to be 
worked on, such as relative poverty and 
graduate unemployment. Bumiputera 
individuals	made	up	62.6%	of	the	32.52	
million Malaysian population, which 
included 3.14 million non-citizens of 
different nationalities (who collectively 
exceed the 2.01 million Malaysians who 
are Indian).”
The Malaysian Department of 
Statistics also reported an uptick in 
household and disposable incomes.
However, this does not mean that 
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among 15-19 year-olds. Male youth 
unemployment is notably high in Sabah, 
while female youth unemployment is 
high	in	most	regions.	While	women’s	
participation in Science, Technology 
and Engineering remains low, Aun 
noted that “... upper secondary and 
tertiary-level students found female 
respondents to be more career-minded 
that their male counterparts (KRI 
2018).6 Among tertiary students, larger 
shares of women compared to men 
regard work success with clear career 
goals as their main goal in life.” In a 
patriarchal society like Malaysia, this 
is most shameful for many Malay men 
who are brought up to be the heads of 
households.	Aun’s	study	is	supported	
by many others and media reports on 
the	declining	of	Malay	men’s	career	and	
educational paths.
In a country where a particular 
race, the Malays, are regarded as the 
rightful heirs to the land, and Muslims 
at	that,	these	findings	are	frightening	
and very real to them.[]
on women and children in low-
income urban families in Malaysia, as 
well as the relevance, adequacy and 
accessibility of public policy responses 
to the pandemic. The project involved 
surveying 500 low-income households 
living	in	sixteen	of	Kuala	Lumpur’s	
public housing estates in May 2020, 
September 2020, December 2020 and 
March 2021. Given its focus on the 
residents	of	Kuala	Lumpur’s	low-cost	
public housing estates, Families on 
the Edge is not intended to provide 
nationally representative data but rather 
aims	to	provide	specific	insights	into	the	
experiences	of	Malaysia’s	urban	low-
income families who comprise around 
10	percent	of	Malaysia’s	population,”	
the report began.
Adding to the matter above, young 
Malay men are angry at the lack of 
opportunities. In a paper by Lee Hwok 
Aun,[8] He wrote about how “... 
Unemployment has been rising among 
20-24 year-olds, particularly in urban 
areas, and remains persistently high 
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